Recent Developments by Karlson, Daisy C.
Arkansas Law Review




University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/alr
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Arkansas Law Review by an
authorized editor of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact scholar@uark.edu, ccmiddle@uark.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daisy C. Karlson, Recent Developments, 70 Ark. L. Rev. 193 (2017).
Available at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/alr/vol70/iss1/6
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Eighth Circuit Holds ADA Compensatory Damages 
Claims Survive Death 
Guenther v. Griffin Constr. Co., Inc., 846 F.3d 979 
(8th Cir. 2017). 
This past January, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit reversed the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Arkansas and held a claim for 
compensatory damages under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA) survives the death of an aggrieved party.  The case 
arose after Griffin Construction terminated employee Semmie 
John Guenther, Jr. in 2013.  When he was originally diagnosed 
with prostate cancer in 2012, the company granted his request 
for three weeks of leave from work to receive treatment.  
However, in 2013, when he learned that the cancer had spread 
and he requested an additional three weeks of leave to undergo 
radiation therapy, Griffin Construction fired him and 
immediately cancelled his insurance policies. 
While Guenther timely filed a charge of discrimination 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 
he died before the agency completed its administrative process 
and issued a right-to-sue letter.  The special administrator of 
Guenther’s estate filed suit under Title I of the ADA and a 
section of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA).1  Griffin 
Construction argued the claims did not survive death in their 
motion to dismiss, and the District Court agreed.  Noting the 
“difficult question of state law,” the District Court found that the 
federal common law provided for application of Arkansas’s tort 
survival statute.2  Judge Timothy Brooks entered judgment on 
1. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-101(a)(1) (West 2016).
2. Guenther v. Griffin Constr. Co., Inc., 161 F. Supp. 3d 665, 667 (W.D. Ark. 2016),
rev’d, 846 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 2017). 
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the pleadings for Griffin Construction, concluding Guenther’s 
ADA claim abated at death. 
Writing for the Eighth Circuit, Chief Judge William Jay 
Riley reversed the District Court.  Judge Riley first addressed 
how Congress could have instructed the judiciary whether 
federal claims survive a complainant’s death.  Not only is there 
no general federal survival statute for federal-question cases, 
there is nothing on claim abatement within the text of the ADA.  
Even though 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) instructs courts to fill gaps 
with state law when state law is not inconsistent with federal 
law, the Eighth Circuit agreed with Judge Brooks that the statute 
does not apply to the ADA.  Relying on a Tenth Circuit case, the 
court decided that federal common law should govern the issue 
of ADA claim survival since Congress has not expressed a 
contrary intent.3  Rather, Congress’s intent in passing the ADA 
was to provide a comprehensive national mandate with “clear, 
strong, consistent, [and] enforceable standards” for addressing 
disability-based discrimination.4 
In considering the ADA’s intent, the opinion makes two 
points.  First, state law should not be incorporated where it 
would “frustrate” a federal program’s intent.  The abatement of 
ADA claims would pose “a special threat to enforcement” 
because the very health issue that led an employee to file their 
claim could lead to or cause the individual’s death before the 
administrative process runs its course (as was seen in Guenther’s 
case).  Second, unlike state law, a uniform federal rule would 
ensure consistent and evenhanded application of the ADA. 
Griffin Construction argued that applying state statutes of 
limitation was similar to applying state survivorship laws, and 
the tort survival language contained in ACRA should control.  
The Eighth Circuit flatly rejected this notion, faulting the 
“analogy to comparing apples to oranges.”  In concluding that 
federal common law does not incorporate state law to determine 
survivorship of an ADA claim, the Eighth Circuit gave 
Guenther’s administrator and future plaintiffs’ estates the green 
3. Smith v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 876 F.2d 832, 834 (10th Cir. 1989).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2), (b)(1)-(2) (2009).
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light to bring ADA claims in the place of the decedent.  
However, the court did not provide any view as to “whether a 
claim for punitive damages would survive,” and cautioned that it 
was not answering the question “whether a claim under any 
other federal scheme warrants a uniform rule of survivorship.” 
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Federal Judge Permanently Enjoins State Authorities 
from Enforcing Anti-Begging Law 
Rodgers v. Bryant, No. 4:16-cv-775-BRW (E.D. Ark. Nov. 22, 
2016) (order granting preliminary injunction). 
In late November, United States District Judge Billy Joe 
Wilson granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the state 
from enforcing a section of its loitering statute.  Under Arkansas 
Code Annotated § 5-71-213(a)(3), a person commits a class C 
misdemeanor if he or she “[l]ingers or remains in a public place 
or on the premises of another for the purpose of begging.”5  In 
enjoining the law, Judge Wilson concluded that the anti-begging 
section “infringe[d] on the freedom of speech guaranteed under 
the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution.” 
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Arkansas 
filed the case on behalf of two plaintiffs:  one disabled veteran in 
Garland County and one homeless male in Benton County.  
Both plaintiffs were previously cited for violating § 5-71-
213(a)(3).  Plaintiff Michael Andrews Rodgers was arrested 
once and cited four times while holding up a sign that identified 
him as a veteran.  After getting convicted in Garland County 
District Court, the Garland County Circuit Court found the law 
unconstitutional and dismissed the charges.  However, with the 
law in effect in other parts of the state, Rodgers believed the law 
continued to have a direct and chilling effect on his right to 
freedom of speech.  The other plaintiff, Glynn Dilbeck, was 
arrested for holding up a sign asking for money alongside a 
roadway exit in Northwest Arkansas.  While his charge was 
voluntarily dismissed by the prosecuting attorney, he too alleged 
that his fear of further criminal action had a chilling effect on his 
First Amendment right.  Their complaint, filed against the 
Director of the Arkansas State Police, maintained that the anti-
5. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-213 (West 2016).
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begging section of the loitering statute was both 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.6 
The District Court found the plaintiffs had standing to bring 
their First Amendment claims, noting that begging is 
constitutionally-protected.  The plaintiffs’ experiences, wrote 
Judge Wilson, underscored the real threat of being charged for 
begging.  The District Court’s order then addressed the 
Defendant’s concerns that federal courts should abstain and 
defer to the authority of state courts to interpret state law when a 
narrow construction by state courts may avoid constitutional 
concerns.  While the Arkansas Supreme Court has not had the 
opportunity to consider § 5-71-213(a)(3), Judge Wilson declined 
to abstain noting he could “imagine no interpretation shy of 
metaphysical contortions that would save the anti-begging law 
from constitutional concerns.” 
As to the vagueness challenge, the District Court agreed 
with Defendant that persons of ordinary intelligence understand 
what is meant by the term “begging.”  Citing The New American 
Heritage Dictionary, the District Court relied on the term to 
mean asking for money or soliciting alms.  However, the District 
Court agreed with the Plaintiffs that § 5-71-213(a)(3) was not 
narrowly tailored to meet constitutional muster.  Noting that the 
section broadly applied to “begging in all places, at all times, by 
all people,” Judge Wilson determined that the anti-begging 
section violated the First Amendment.  While his court order left 
untouched the other subsections of § 5-71-213, the injunction 
will prevent future arrests or citations from being issued by the 
Arkansas State Police. 
6. Complaint at 1, Rodgers v. Bryant, No. 4:16-cv-775-BRW (E.D. Ark. Oct. 21,
2016). 
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Arkansas Supreme Court Overturns Birth Certificate 
Ruling for Same-Sex Couples 
Smith v. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, 505 S.W.3d 169. 
In a narrow decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court threw 
out Pulaski Circuit Court Judge Tim Fox’s ruling that 
temporarily allowed married same-sex couples to get the names 
of both spouses on their children’s birth certificates without a 
court order.  The case was brought by three couples whose 
children were conceived through artificial insemination by 
anonymous donors.  The six plaintiffs filed their suit in circuit 
court seeking (1) a declaration that the refusal to issue birth 
certificates with the names of both spouses was unconstitutional; 
(2) a finding that certain statutory provisions were
unconstitutional; (3) an order enjoining the Arkansas
Department of Health (ADH) from refusing to list the names;
and (4) an order requiring ADH to issue corrected birth
certificates naming both spouses.  The central question of the
children’s rights relating to their birth certificates was not
argued by the parties or addressed by the circuit court.  The
majority opinion, authored by Justice Josephine Hart, focused
instead on interpreting two portions of the Arkansas Code
relating to the registration of children’s births.7
The majority held that the circuit court erred in concluding 
that the case was controlled by res judicata.  Nathaniel Smith, 
the Director of the ADH, was a party in a previous case that 
granted injunctive relief to same-sex couples.8  However, the 
court noted the absence of the words “birth certificates” from the 
previous order and held that the “language in the [] orders would 
not have placed Smith on notice that he needed to appeal those 
orders to this court and raise on appeal arguments related to the 
overbreadth of the injunctive relief granted and to the issuance 
of birth certificates.” 
7. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-18-401(e)-(f), 20-18, 406(a)(2) (West 2016).
8. Smith v. Wright, No. 60CV-13-2662 (Pulaski Co. Cir. Ct. May 9, 2014); Smith v.
Wright, No. 60CV-13-2662 (Pulaski Co. Cir. Ct. May 15, 2015). 
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The majority then turned to the circuit court’s reliance on 
the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,9 
declaring the decision inapplicable to same-sex birth certificates.  
Arkansas Code Annotated § 20-18-406(a)(2), which establishes 
when the State Registrar of Vital Records can issue new birth 
certificates, uses the language “person to be legitimated.”  The 
circuit court interpreted this phrase in light of Obergefell to 
cover minor children of any married couple.  The majority 
disagreed, reasoning the statute relies on the biological 
relationship of the parents to the child.  It noted that Obergefell 
did not address the question presented, rather it mentioned birth 
certificates only once.  Pointing to the second statute, which the 
circuit court also found unconstitutional, the majority referenced 
the dictionary meanings of “husband” and “father.”  When 
viewed in context of these definitions, “the statute centers on the 
relationship of the biological mother and the biological father to 
the child, not on the marital relationship of husband and wife.” 
In addressing the couples’ facial challenge to the two 
statutes, the majority cited the state’s “important governmental 
objective” in listing biological parents on birth certificates, 
concluding it “does not violate equal protection to acknowledge 
these basic biological truths.”  The majority faulted the circuit 
court for conflating marriage, parental rights and vital records.  
Relying heavily on an affidavit from the Registrar of Vital 
Records, Melinda Allen, the majority placed a strong emphasis 
on this government interest in documenting the nexus between 
biological parents. 
Former Chief Justice Howard Brill and Justice Rhonda 
Wood both concurred in part and dissented in part.  Beginning 
with lyrics from Bob Dylan’s classic, “The Times They Are a-
Changin’,” Justice Brill’s opinion highlighted the unique powers 
held by each branch of government, and it concluded that all 
three branches must protect the constitutional rights of its 
citizens.  Justice Brill also detailed the implications of Judge 
Fox’s ruling through three different scenarios.  In the first 
scenario, two married couples are unable to naturally conceive a 
9. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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baby.  The wife in the heterosexual couple gives birth through 
artificial insemination, as does one of the women in the 
homosexual couple.  However, only the heterosexual couple is 
entitled to a birth certificate because the statute includes the 
word “husband.”  In the second scenario, both couples use 
artificial insemination to have a baby, but neither couple is 
married.  As both are barred from using section 9-10-201(a), 
they must instead rely on a different statute that allows for a new 
birth certificate when there is evidence proving “that the person 
has been legitimated.”10  Justice Brill agreed with the majority 
that Judge Fox erred in giving a court-ordered definition to that 
phrase, while acknowledging that future direction from the 
legislative or executive bodies is necessary to “effect appropriate 
and required changes.”  His dissent questioned the majority’s 
reliance on Melinda Allen’s affidavit, noting that the ADH 
practice described in the affidavit run contrary to the language of 
existing Arkansas statutes—further underscoring the need for 
legislative or executive attention. 
In the third scenario, both couples are married and seek to 
adopt.  Under Obergefell, the statute is gender-neutral and both 
married couples are able to obtain a birth certificate.  These 
scenarios, Justice Brill concluded, provide a snapshot of the 
“variations that may be presented by the changes in society and 
the changes in reproductive methods.”  In referencing the 
musical legend and recent Nobel laureate Bob Dylan one last 
time, he reminded the other branches of government to “heed 
the call.” 
Writing in dissent, Justice Wood discussed how the court 
could utilize the prudential-mootness doctrine to withhold relief 
and instead conduct a full evidentiary hearing.  Characterizing 
the case as “fluctuating and underdeveloped,” she highlighted 
the need for the legislature to review and rewrite the two statutes 
in light of Obergefell.  A remand would allow the legislature “to 
either amend the statute to apply neutrally to same-sex 
marriages or base the benefit on something other than marital 
status.”  The federal doctrine, she argued, is essential when key 
10. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-406(a)(2) (West 2016).
2017] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 201
circumstances in the course of litigation forestall meaningful 
relief.  Both parties, she pointed out, acknowledge that material 
facts have changed. 
Justice Paul Danielson dissented in full, contending that 
listing a parent’s name on a birth certificate is “a benefit 
associated with marriage.”  In Obergefell, the Supreme Court 
listed “birth and death certificates” as those benefits “linked” to 
marital status.  The majority here, Danielson writes, errs in 
favoring biological relationships over marital ones. 
As of publication, two of the three couples have filed a 
petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme 
Court.11 
11. Pavan v. Smith, 2016 Ark. 437, petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb 13, 2017) (No.
16-992).
